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Between Emic and Etic: “Systematic” 
and “Creative” Destruction during 
the Croatian Shipbuilding Crisis1
This article examines the trope of systematic destruction (sustavno/sistemsko 
uništavanje) and traces how it was mobilized during the 2018 Croatian shipbuilding 
crisis. First, an ethnographic vignette introduces the political actors and issues at 
stake during the crisis. The literature on post-socialist labor transformations and 
deindustrialization in South-East Europe is reviewed, and the tensions between 
political actors and policy are described. The concept of “predatory privatization” 
and the etic concept of “creative destruction” are then discussed as a prelude to 
an analysis of the emic concept of “systematic destruction.” Finally, the relations 
between the different concepts are described and the emotive power and political 
uses of the “systematic destruction” trope are explored and placed in the wider 
context of post-Yugoslav deindustrialization.
1 Research for this article has been funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) through its project grant ‘Transformations from Below. 
Shipyards and Labour Relations in the Uljanik (Croatia) and Gdynia (Poland) Shipyards since 
the 1980s’ (2016-2019), Project No. 270620597. I would like to thank Ognjen Kojanić and Ulf 
Brunnbauer for their comments on this paper, and Miloš Jovanović for his comments on the 
idea of systematic destruction.
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Introduction: Mayday
A crowd of people are slowly gathering in the public square beneath 
an imposing Roman arch in the city center of Pula, known locally as Zlatna 
vrata (lit. golden gate). It is May 1, and red carnations are being handed out 
to passers-by, while a brass band and choir dressed in red have assembled 
and are preparing to sing. The mostly elderly crowd are gathering here for 
Pula’s official May 1 commemorations, and many have settled into seats 
on the outside terraces of neighboring cafes, which offer a good view of 
the proceedings to the expectant crowd. At the back, a group of activists 
from a radical left party, the Workers’ Front (Radnička fronta), are holding 
up a banner with the slogan “The Struggle Continues” written in Croatian 
and Italian.2 The atmosphere is light and pleasant, and the temperature 
comfortably warm. The choir and brass band strike up in song, performing 
a variety of melodies, including the Internationale, before several local 
authority figures move to the stage, poised to engage with the crowd. 
First, the vice mayor of Pula gives a speech focused mostly on the positive 
aspects of life in Pula. He describes Istria as the only region in Croatia with 
net positive immigration, while people in other parts of the country are 
leaving in large numbers to live in Germany, Ireland, and other EU countries. 
He also mentions that Pula is home to the largest number of entrepreneurs 
per capita in Croatia and makes a sympathetic reference to the difficult 
situation at the Uljanik Shipyard. An Italian-minority official then greets 
the crowd and gives a speech in Italian. Following this, a representative 
from the largest of the Uljanik Shipyard’s three unions, Jadranski sindikat, 
gives a highly emotive speech about the current difficulties there. He 
mentions the declining numbers of workers over the decades and the 
protests that followed the late payment of wages in January 2018, and 
highlights workers’ fears over the impending announced “restructuring.” 
His tone is more powerful than the vice mayor’s, and the crowd responds to 
his speech with a cheer of agreement. Following this, the officials gather 
and place a wreath comprised of red carnations on a memorial site in the 
square in memory of victims killed by the Italian authorities during the 
interwar period of Italian fascist rule. More music is played, and then the 
crowd disperses.
Minutes later, in the city’s main square, Forum, where the city hall 
is located, a small and eccentric-looking group—members of the Workers’ 
Front—arrive with a megaphone, imploring the people there “and tourists who 
understand Croatian” to listen to their message. Standing in front of the town 
hall, they display several banners with the slogans “decentralize Pula,” “for a 
Pula in which everybody decides,” and “Capitalism – some live in palaces while 
others dig through rubbish.”3 A group member then reads out a long, scripted 
speech about the damaging effects of the ruling regional party’s clientelism 
and the failure of the city authorities to address many everyday social 
2 Italian: La lotta continua, a phrase that also relates to a historical radical left organization 
with links to Operaismo that emerged in Italy in the mid-1960s.
3 “Decentralizirajmo Pulu,” “za Pulu u kojoj svi odlučujemo,” “Kapitalizam: jedni žive u dvorcima 
dok drugi kopaju po smeću.” Translations: “(let’s) decentralize Pula,” “for a Pula in which we 
all decide,” “Capitalism: some live in castles while others scoop through rubbish.”
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problems and inequalities. As quickly as they arrived, the group whisks off in 
the direction of the Uljanik Shipyard, and they complete their intervention in 
public space with another monologue on the crisis in Croatian shipbuilding. 
The contradictory position of the recently chosen “strategic partner” for the 
shipyard’s “restructuring,” a local tycoon who owns the concession to several 
luxury hotels in Pula, is the crux of their criticism. Before leaving to prepare 
for other interventions later that day, they cite his poor record in working 
with other Croatian shipyards, his imprisonment for economic crimes during 
the former Yugoslav period, and his allegedly suspect fortune amassed in the 
South African platinum mining industry.
Mayday Political Actors and the Uljanik Shipyard Crisis
The two Mayday gatherings had a strikingly different character, 
which reflected generational differences and sources of funding among the 
political left’s orientation in Croatia. The older, more official commemoration 
highlighted the greater continuity of institutions and experience of the 
former Yugoslavia, combined with higher levels of official support from 
trade unions. In the case of Istria, a region that, along with historically left-
leaning parts of Italy’s industrial northeast near the Slovenian border, is 
sometimes referred to as the “Red Adriatic,”4 there was clear support from 
the city authorities for center-left political organizations that had a generally 
positive view of many aspects of the socialist Yugoslav system. In contrast, 
the second Mayday gathering embodied the spirit of a more radical protest 
orientation among the (mostly) younger Croatian left that had emerged out 
of the university protests and struggles of the late 2000s. Many of these 
activists had no direct experience of socialist Yugoslavia, nor of the nineties’ 
wars for the younger among them.5
Many of those present at the larger commemoration had a direct 
stake in or a close connection with the crisis currently unfolding at the 
shipyard. In January 2018, workers did not receive their monthly wage on 
time, and protests broke out before the EU Commission granted additional 
funding to cover costs during a short “restructuring” period. The shipyard 
management chose a local tycoon as their strategic partner, whom many 
did not believe was serious about saving the shipyard from significant 
downsizing or bankruptcy. It later came to light that this tycoon intended 
to repurpose large parts of the shipyard space located in Pula’s city 
center for tourism. After a further six months of squandered time and 
money, mass worker protests erupted, with the government seeking to 
intervene. Several top-level members of the shipyard management were 
later arrested. Shortly after, the shipyard closed and many of its assets 
were liquidated.6
4 Eric R. Terzuolo,  Red Adriatic: The Communist Parties of Italy and Yugoslavia (New York: 
Routledge, 2019).
5 Paul Stubbs, “Networks, Organisations, Movements: Narratives and Shapes of Three Waves 
of Activism in Croatia,” Polemos 15, no. 30 (2012): 11–32.
6 See “Uljanik Shipyard’s Holding Company Liquidated by Creditors,” accessed on February 14, 
2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/uljanik-shipyard-s-holding-company-
liquidated-by-creditors.
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The vice mayor who gave a speech at the larger commemoration is a 
member of a regionalist party named the IDS (Istarski demokratski sabor). The 
IDS were widely accused of being part of a clientelist web seeking to profit 
from the expansion of tourism in Pula at the expense of the shipyard—more 
specifically through seeking to convert part of the shipyard’s grounds into 
a luxury marina. A small number of public statements the party leader had 
made on tourism several years ago were cited, and rumors circulated that 
their motives were aligned with those of the chosen strategic partner. As 
the crisis deepened, this regionalist party, which was nominally center-left, 
came into conflict with the ruling right-wing party, HDZ (Croatian Democratic 
Union). The HDZ have been caught in a double bind between the transfer of 
class power enabled by neoliberalism7 (which many believe has established 
a “crony-capitalist” or “comprador” class of business and property owners 
linked directly to their party) and the party’s informal social contract with 
poorer and more rural sections of the population due to capturing voter 
bases through offering privileged access to employment and other benefits.8 
In contrast to states such as Poland where neoliberal shock therapy was 
introduced, such changes were slower due to various reasons, not least 
because of the wars in the 1990s.9 While declaratively pro-EU and committed 
to implementing market reforms, the HDZ’s capture of certain voter bases, 
including war veterans receiving substantial pensions and other benefits, 
resulted in delays to or blocking of certain reforms.10
Regarding Uljanik, sharp words had been exchanged between 
members of the IDS and the HDZ, with both sides arguing that the other 
party was responsible for Uljanik’s collapse. The IDS line was that the HDZ 
government had deliberately wanted to destroy Uljanik. Members of the HDZ 
argued, in contrast, that they had done all they could (within the confines of 
the EU framework) to save Uljanik, and that the IDS, in league with the Uljanik 
management, had been running the firm into the ground over the past thirty 
years.11
The shipyard also housed three trade unions, and this multiplicity 
reflected the relatively fragmented political opposition. Two of the unions 
sat on Uljanik’s supervisory board and were regarded by workers as being 
largely ineffective. The third, more militant union, gave a speech at the 
commemoration described above and also helped forge links with a self-
7 David Harvey, “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 610, no. 1 (2007): 21–44.
8 Dražen Hoffmann et al., Naša zarobljena mista (Zagreb: GONG, 2017).
9 Elizabeth C. Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor 
(Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
10 Paul Stubbs and Siniša Zrinščak, “Citizenship and Social Welfare in Croatia: Clientelism and 
the Limits of ‘Europeanisation’,” European Politics and Society 16, no. 3 (2015): 395–410.
11 See “Miletić: HDZ bi platio da je Uljanik u Lici, u Istri nemaju glasače,” April 8, 2019, https://
www.ids-ddi.com/vijesti/aktualno/6349/miletic-hdz-bi-platio-da-je-uljanik-u-lici-u-istri-
nemaju-glasace/ and “Istarski HDZ: Uljanik je preživo sve, ali ne i pustošenje najvećih 
istarskih sinova,” January 21, 2020, https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/istarski-hdz-
uljanik-je-prezivo-sve-ali-ne-i-pustosenje-najvecih-istarskih-sinova-20200122. I discuss 
the apportioning of blame in Andrew Hodges, “Psychic Landscapes, Worker Organizing and 
Blame. Uljanik and the 2018 Croatian Shipbuilding Crisis,”  Südost Europa  67, no. 1 (2019): 
50–74.
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organized workers’ initiative, called Headquarters for the Defense of Uljanik 
(Stožer za obranu Uljanika), that emerged during the crisis.12
Nevertheless, since EU membership had become a key goal of the 
political elite from the early 2000s onwards, structural reforms had been 
undertaken over the past fifteen years with strict IMF rules on how public 
money could be spent. Such reforms placed limits both on the mobilizing 
power of trade unions and on the ways in which shipbuilding could be funded. 
EU competition law (chapter IV) demanded the privatization of Croatian 
shipyards as a condition for Croatia’s accession, and it stipulated strict 
conditions on further state subsidies for shipbuilding. After the shipyard 
was floated on the stock market in 2012, in line with a worker-ownership 
model (workers owned 46% of shares),13 rumors began to circulate about 
the new shipyard management’s intentions and their relationships to the 
aforementioned political parties. In the early to mid-2010s, several new 
political parties also began to emerge.
New Political Actors and “Systematic Destruction”
More recent parties that have emerged in Croatia include the 
Workers’ Front (Radnička fronta) on the radical left, founded in 2014, and 
Human Blockade (Živi zid), a political party founded in 2011 that has combined 
elements of political ideas from both the left and the right of the ideological 
spectrum. Both parties had taken an interest in the shipyard crisis, with 
the Workers’ Front pushing for nationalization of the shipyard, with Human 
Blockade and even the IDS later coming to share this view.14
During the crisis, one of the tropes that these various groups and 
parties mobilized—as did members of the general public—was the notion of 
“systematic destruction,” used sometimes in a reactionary, resigned fashion, 
while at other times as a call to arms. Here, systematic destruction refers to 
the perceived non-transparent, destructive activities of agents positioned at 
the top of a hierarchy (e.g., the company management, the local or national 
government, Brussels), acting according to a hidden agenda of deliberately 
running a large business into the ground for their own personal gain. It relates 
to a number of other tropes, such as predatory privatization (both emic and 
etic) and the etic concept of “creative destruction.” One interpretation of the 
latter has come to assume a key influence on EU policy making regarding 
competition, with strict laws on the kind of aid EU states may offer struggling 
firms.15
This article examines this family of analytic and field concepts and 
their psycho-political life in the field, and interprets them as “structures 
12 For more details, see “Could a self-governed workers’ movement boost Croatia’s dying 
shipbuilding industry?” December 17, 2018, https://www.equaltimes.org/could-a-self-
governed-workers?lang=en#.XkaQUSj7QuQ.
13 Marina Šunjerga, “Mali vlasnici drže 46%, država 25,5%, a Adris 12,4% Uljanika,” Večernji 
List, August 28, 2018, https://www.vecernji.hr/biznis/mali-vlasnici-drze-46-drzava-25–5-
a-adris-12–4-uljanika-1266223.
14 See “Živi zid: Brodogradilišta odmah vratiti u državno vlasništvo!” February 12, 2019, https://
www.24sata.hr/news/zivi-zid-brodogradilista-odmah-vratiti-u-drzavno-vlasnistvo-613781.
15 See “State Aid Control,” accessed on October 12, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/
state_aid/overview/index_en.html.
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of feeling” grounded in material conditions of existence that relate to 
the shipbuilding crisis.16 It begins by contextualizing their use within 
the ideological changes that resulted in a redefinition of the value and 
importance of work (understood here as employment). This redefinition was 
experienced by many as a form of loss, and this conceptual family, which 
includes potentially reactionary and revolutionary elements, emerged to 
describe workers’ experience of these changes. Following this, “predatory 
privatization” and “creative destruction” will be examined, and their relation to 
EU policy and political change in the post-Yugoslav region will be described. 
Finally, systematic destruction will then be discussed. In particular, the 
psycho-political power of the systematic destruction trope will be analyzed in 
reference to the Uljanik shipbuilding crisis. Several of the trope’s properties—
its productive ambiguity, emotive power, and upward movement—will be 
discussed and related to workers’ practices of self-organizing during the 
Uljanik Shipyard crisis.
Post-Yugoslav Labor Transformations and Deindustrialization
For 50 years we haven’t been recuperating. And where are we then with 
tourism and industry? We’ve destroyed the ironworks, we’ve destroyed 
shipbuilding, we’ve destroyed the textile, wood, and furniture industries, 
there’s nothing left. And everything is being thrown into tourism, 
unfortunately. (Welder, male, in his 60s)
What is the alternative for me, as an ordinary citizen, who hasn’t got a 
restaurant, hotel, apartment—who works exclusively at that Uljanik, what’s 
my alternative to earn a living? Germany? Fuck off. (Crane operator, male, 
in his mid-30s)
These quotes from interviews conducted with Uljanik workers 
during Spring 2018 highlight stances toward and the depth of feeling around 
the crisis in which the Uljanik Shipyard was embroiled at that time. Above 
and beyond the shipyard, they highlight a perceived negative trajectory 
that relates to processes of deindustrialization and devaluing industrial 
labor that have occurred during the “transition” to capitalism in Croatia. 
Numerous other studies of post-socialist labor transformations17 have drawn 
attention to similar feelings of loss and disorientation, changes in how work 
is recognized, and the decrease in workers’ rights that has accompanied 
the “transition” as inscribed in labor laws.18 The labor historian Chiara 
Bonfiglioli noted that, “while industrial workers were bestowed with symbolic 
recognition and social rights during socialist time, post-socialist transition 
led to an overall devaluation of industrial labor, notably women’s labor, 
16 Raymond Williams, “Structures of Feeling,” Marxism and literature 1 (1977): 128–35.
17 Ognjen Kojanić, “Nostalgia as a Practice of the Self in Post-Socialist Serbia,” Canadian 
Slavonic Papers 57, no. 3–4 (2015): 195–212; Ivan Rajković, “Concern for the State: ‘Normality,’ 
State Effect and Distributional Claims in Serbia,” Гласник Етнографског института САНУ 
65, no. 1 (2017): 31–45; Tea Škokić and Sanja Potkonjak, “‘Working Class Gone to Heaven’: 
From Working Class to Middle Class and Back,” Narodna umjetnost 1, no. 53 (2016): 117–32. 
18 Mario Reljanović, “The Normative Position of Trade Unions and the Ideals of Self-
Management,” in We Have Built Cities for You: On the Contradictions of Yugoslav Socialism, 
ed. Vida Knežević and Marko Miletić (Belgrade: Center CZKD – Center for Cultural 
Decontamination. 2018), 61–80.
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across newly formed post-Yugoslav states.”19 This structure of feeling can be 
distinguished from feelings of loss associated with a fall in living standards20 
and the dissolution of a Yugoslav “we.”21 More specifically, it relates to the 
disruption of routines and normal lives that accompanied changes in the 
material position and social valuation of work.22 A prosaic yet important point 
is the strong socialist connotation often attached to industrial work in this 
context, which is connected with sweeping industrialization during the early 
socialist Yugoslav period. This connotation partly explains its ideological and 
practical neglect by the post-Yugoslav national elite in Croatia that sought 
to distance itself from socialist ideology during and following the war. The 
events at the shipyard were therefore inserted into a wider negative narrative 
of the region’s capitalist trajectory, and a family of concepts were used by 
the different political actors mentioned in the introduction to articulate 
dimensions to this process.
Predatory Privatization, Creative Destruction, 
Systematic Destruction: A Conceptual Family?
The concept of predatory privatization is a field concept and has been 
used analytically—albeit sparingly—in academic and business literatures.23 It 
typically refers to a situation whereby a company is managed or purchased 
by actors who deliberately seek to run the enterprise into the ground. This is 
often to enable asset-stripping, in which a relatively easy profit can be made 
through the sale of assets when they are valued at more than the company’s 
net worth instead of engaging in making a struggling company “profitable” 
again. One related concept is that of “intentional bankruptcy” (namerni stečaj), 
which is also used to refer to such predatory privatizations.24 “Intentional 
bankruptcy” could be considered a more extreme example of predatory 
privatization, and the less extreme variant would consist of a separating an 
enterprise into profitable and unprofitable elements and permitting the slow 
failure of the unprofitable elements. The state sometimes plays a role as an 
actor in this process, for example, through forms of “cronyism” by selling firms 
to individuals well-positioned in the state bureaucracy. In the post-socialist 
literature, Kupka briefly mentions “predatory” privatization at the end of an 
article on capitalist “transition” in the Czech Republic, defining it as “when 
the management of a state enterprise founds small stock companies that 
19 Chiara Bonfiglioli, “Post-Socialist Deindustrialisation and Its Gendered Structure of Feeling: 
The Devaluation of Women’s Work in the Croatian Garment Industry,” Labor History 61, no. 1 
(2020): 36–47, 42.
20 Especially in Serbia, see Marina Simić, “Travel and the State after the ‘Fall’: Everyday Modes 
of Transport in Post-Socialist Serbia,” in Mobilities in Socialist and Post-Socialist States, 
Societies on the Move, eds. Kathy Burrell and Kathrin Hörschelmann (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 173–93.
21 See Ivana Spasić, “Smrt Bricea Tatona i uslovni kosmopolitizam socijalističke Jugoslavije,” 
in Horror-porno-ennui: kulturne prakse postsocijalizma, eds. Ines Prica and Tea Škokić 
(Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 2011), 51–69.
22 See Jessica Greenberg, “On the Road to Normal: Negotiating Agency and State Sovereignty 
in Postsocialist Serbia,” American Anthropologist 113, no. 1 (2011): 88–100.
23 In the latter the terms “corporate raider” and “asset stripping” are more often used 
(pejoratively) to describe such practices that increased in the USA from the 1970s onwards.
24 Ivan Rajković, “Concern.”
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flourish at the expense of the sinking state enterprise, which they brazenly 
exploit.”25 This definition suggests coordinated siphoning off of the firm’s 
resources into a smaller, “profitable” entity. This is arguably what happened 
when Uljanik was privatized: a smaller profitable entity (Uljanik plovidba 
d.d.) in which the top-tier management bought shares did well on the stock 
market, while shares in the larger Uljanik d.d., which workers purchased, 
sank.
A more general definition of predatory privatization that I came 
across in field conversations was “the hostile takeover of an enterprise under 
the patronage of the state,” a view that described state structures as being 
compromised by interest groups using them for their own gain. This is also 
visible in the verb privatizirati (lit. to privatize), which was sometimes used 
pejoratively to refer to individuals taking over an institution for their own 
personal gain.26 In Serbia, the sociologist Nada Novaković, in an analysis of 
workers’ strikes from 1990–2015, briefly mentions the concept of predatory 
privatization in relation to discussions in the Serbian media over the firm 
Sartid:
Sartid had a debt of 1.7 billion dollars, alongside commitments to creditors, 
cancelled (a debt to the state remained). Slobodan Antonić characterized 
the sale of MKS or “Sartid” as a “predatory privatization” and explained their 
debts in detail, noting that the state had previously invested around three 
billion dollars in this enterprise.27
The scholar Novaković is referring to is a political figure in the anti-
establishment right in Serbia. This emphasizes the cross-ideological appeal 
of such a trope and, in the case of Uljanik, its use by actors on both the left and 
right. I suggest that this relates to its presence in working-class structures 
of feeling, which following Raymond Williams I understand as explicitly not 
hegemonic, but emergent forms in particular class bases.28
The related concept of creative destruction has been used by a range 
of theorists and policy makers in different ways, from Marx to Schumpeter 
and Harvey.29 All three authors understood the process of creative 
destruction as intrinsic to capitalism and as contributing to its eventual 
demise. Marx’s view combined a deep respect for the revolutionary power of 
capitalism as enacted through such processes with a deep concern for the 
social inequalities it created. David Harvey paid attention to the increased 
volatility of the neoliberal variant of capitalism, in which “periodic episodes of 
growth interspersed with phases of creative destruction, usually registered 
as severe financial crises.”30 Schumpeter’s view of creative destruction was 
somewhat more positive:
25 Martin Kupka, “Transformation of Ownership in Czechoslovakia,” Eastern European 
Economics 31, no. 1 (1992): 25–46.
26 In exclamations such as “Privatizirao/la je udrugu” (lit. S/he privatised the association).
27 Nada Novaković, Radnički štrajkovi u Srbiji od 1990. do 2015. godine (Belgrade: Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe and Institut društvenih nauka, 2017), 219.
28 Williams, “Structures.” 
29 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Penguin, 1993); Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy (London: Routledge: 1976); Harvey, “Neoliberalism.” 
30 Harvey, “Neoliberalism,” 34.
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[The process of innovation] incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one. This process of creative destruction is the essential 
fact about capitalism.31
Schumpeter’s description of innovation through cycles of creative 
destruction is relevant here as it has significantly influenced EU policy 
making regarding competition and entrepreneurship, and an EU chapter 
on competition law affected the Croatian government’s ability to continue 
to sustain shipbuilding via the provision of certain forms of state aid. It has 
also influenced the role and understanding of entrepreneurs as key actors 
able to innovate and bring about positive change in times of economic crisis. 
As mentioned in the introductory vignette, this was also true of the IDS 
representatives, who placed special emphasis on entrepreneurship. They 
emphasized that Istria was home to the largest number of entrepreneurs 
per capita in Croatia and attempted to attract entrepreneurs to relocate 
there. Tourism was also presumed fit to accommodate workers following 
Uljanik’s dissolution or downsizing. While tourism was heavily promoted by 
the Croatian government, it was viewed as unambiguously inferior by many, 
as the technical skills involved were neither as specific nor precise as those 
consolidated over the years of shipbuilding.
During Yugoslavia, “systematic destruction” perhaps entered more 
widely into popular culture through the film Kako sam sistematski uništen od 
idiota (1983) (literally translated as: How Idiots Systematically Destroyed Me), 
directed by Slobodan Šijan,32 who referred to the concept in relation to class 
war. The film’s title denotes a long essay written by a homeless, wandering 
Marxist to describe his difficulties during the liberalizing Yugoslav socialism 
of the late 1960s when society was rocked by student protests against 
the “red bourgeoisie.”33 While related, the field concept of “systematic 
destruction” does not have the positive gloss present in Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction”—it simply references intentional destruction rather 
than any space of creative possibility generated therein. This is unsurprising 
from a worker perspective; the destructive actions and disruption are salient. 
Notably, the trope has a troublesome history that imbues it with a strong 
emotive connotation. It has also been used to refer to the destruction of an 
“identity” or “culture,” including the real physical and systematic destruction 
of urban environments during the Yugoslav wars and the liquidation of 
populations in concentration camps during the Second World War.34 Such 
connotations underlie the assumption that what is being destroyed is more 
31 Schumpeter, Capitalism, 83.
32 Sustavno and sistemsko are synonyms, the former more widely used in Croatia and the latter 
in Serbia.
33 See Jana Baćević, “Pogled unazad: Antropološka analiza uvođenja usmerenog obrazovanja 
u SFRJ,” Antropologija 1 (2006): 107.
34 See also systematische Vernichtung and systematic annihilation. A quick internet search 
reveals that the term has been used on numerous occasions to refer to genocidal 
acts. Examples include Ivana Cvijović Javorina, “Jovan Bajford, Staro Sajmište: A Site 
Remembered, Forgotten, Contested,” Historijski zbornik 65, no. 2 (2012): 541; Martin Coward, 
“Community as Heterogeneous Ensemble: Mostar and Multiculturalism,” Alternatives 27, no. 
1 (2002): 29–66.
andrew hodges:  Between Emic  and Et ic :  “Systematic”  and “Creat ive ”  Destruct ion 
during  the  Croat ian  Shipbuild ing  Cr is is
104
than a singular industry but a “culture” or a “way of life” in the sense that 
Raymond Williams described. They also denote a process that often plays 
out over many years.
Systematic Destruction in Worker Narratives
This trope continually cropped up over the course of my fieldwork, 
from my first conversation with an apartment host picking me up from 
the bus station, to numerous conversations with a variety of workers and 
political actors who had a stake in Uljanik or a wider interest. In interviews 
with Uljanik workers, several possible examples were given of perceived 
“deliberate mistakes” that were very costly for the company. A worker active 
in one of the trade unions made the following comment:
Worker: What we once did easily, with our eyes closed, today we can’t do 
without repeating the same thing two or three times. This means that we’re 
destroying material, we’re losing hours through first setting up, then taking 
down, then setting up, then taking down, and then happens what? In the end 
you don’t get the job done on time and then you have to pay more. And then 
that’s why workers began saying the destruction is systematic, intentional –
Author: Aha, intentional.
Worker: Intentional. Unfortunately, I often ask myself if it’s really intentional 
or a coincidence. For example, just so you get a feel of how it is: in the place 
where the steel and tin should have been inserted with a 6mm thickness, 
we put them in at 9mm, and where we should have put them in at 9, we put 
them in at 6. Not once. Lots of times. And nobody can convince me that this 
is accidental. This is just one example. (Trade union activist, male, mid-40s)
This is an everyday example of a practice that potentially consists 
of sabotaging the firm’s potential to deliver on time, and therefore also 
its profit-making potential. In addition to practical “mistakes” on the job, 
processes such as public tenders for services also generated suspicion. One 
worker mentioned the price of painting ships suddenly doubling overnight, 
and when workers raised this as an issue, they were told to ignore it. In 
addition to intentional harm, workers mentioned a lack of expertise on the 
part of some of the new foremen:35
It happened a few times, a person, a fitter, an experienced fitter familiar 
with the outline, who knows his work, he’d look and say “this is impossible.” 
He’s told “it is impossible, but do it.” And he assembles it, and then later 
the foreman says, “let’s replace it,” and while you’re cutting it, until the new 
material arrives to patch it up, weeks pass by. And once again you pay a 
welder, handyman, fitter for those hours. (Machine operator, male, mid-30s)
35 I have chosen to use the non-gender neutral term “men” here, as its reflects the strongly 
male-gendered environment at Uljanik. While there were famous examples of women 
working as welders, etc., the vast majority of people I interviewed with roles involving hard 
labour or the management of industrial spaces were men. A more extensive study of the 
Uljanik environment would not be complete without an in-depth analysis of gender, and 
indeed, scholars such as Andrea Matošević have completed work in this vein. See Andrea 
Matošević, “A lot of sweat, a little bit of fun, and not entirely ‘hard men’: Worker’s Masculinity 
in the Uljanik Shipyard,” in Everyday Life in the Balkans, ed. David Montgomery (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2019).
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Similar ideas were present in discussions about the situation more 
widely in the region, as Uljanik was one example of several large industrial 
companies that had been reduced in size or been closed completely:
We had the mighty Sisak Ironworks. Renovate it a little, do something, 
invest, you can’t not invest in it for fifty years. We head an aluminum 
foundry, a rarity, down in Šibenik I think. Same goes – invest a little! Do 
some restructuring, employ a young workforce and so on! How come it’s 
worthwhile for others to work, but not for us? Just tourism and trade. 
(Welder, male, in his 60s)
Another time, I conducted an interview in May 2018 with a retired 
welder named Ivan, who had worked at Uljanik for forty years. When arranging 
the meeting, I spoke with his wife, Jadranka, on the phone, and she later 
sat in on the interview and asked lots of questions. Ivan, who was covered 
in tiny scars from the sparks of welding, described how they had changed 
the technology they used. Nowadays they used a CO2 system, which could 
be much faster, but according to Ivan, the quality was lower, and this was 
visible in the quality of the ships produced. He said many of these ships now 
have lots of tiny holes in them, whereas before they didn’t. This system was 
also less labor intensive, so there were fewer welders. Ivan then talked in 
more general terms about the situation at Uljanik. He was nostalgic for the 
socialist Uljanik, saying that it was a much better system because “it looked 
after its workers, while the new system just looks after the managers.” 
The new managers do not understand hard shipyard labor as they are not 
“experts” (stručnjaci), meaning they cannot do the tasks those beneath 
them do, and therefore cannot see errors etc. He said the new system had 
destroyed industry and Uljanik was now heading in this direction. Jadranka, 
however, saw things quite differently. She said that the problem in Croatia 
was “wild capitalism” (divlji kapitalizam), while “real capitalism was just” (pravi 
kapitalizam je pravedan), arguing that even the poorest paid legal worker 
in Germany can afford to live on the wage they receive. Jadranka used to 
work for Agrokor, a Croatian agricultural conglomerate and supplier that 
went bankrupt. She had left and received her pension a short while before 
it went bust, so she was not directly affected. Yet when both talked about 
the post-socialist period in Croatia, they spoke negatively, using the phrase 
“systematic destruction of industry” (sustavno uništavanje industrije), which 
unified and elided their differences in perspective. In this paradigm, the idea 
of systematic destruction was a resigned commentary on the path that heavy 
industrial work had taken over the course of the post-socialist “transition.” 
The concept was used quite differently, however, by several of the political 
actors described earlier.
Systematic Destruction in Political Discourse
Rather than spoken with resignation as a comment on an ill-fated 
situation believed to be too difficult to prevent, “systematic destruction” 
was mobilized accusatorily by political actors as a charge directed at certain 
individuals or institutions. Such use more closely relates to its effectiveness 
in garnering interest in and concern for the fate of the shipyard. The 
trope’s political usefulness also lay in the ambiguity underpinning its non-
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identification with any single political tradition, therein serving a powerful 
function in unifying narratives present on the left and anti-establishment 
right.
Crucially, the trope externalized blame and directed it upwards to 
individuals or groups at the top of company and wider political hierarchies, 
while leaving the actors unnamed. For instance, one of Human Blockade’s 
representatives on the Pula city council stated on the record that Uljanik 
was being systematically destroyed in line with the European Union’s wishes. 
Interestingly, as the crisis played out, similar tropes were employed by 
members of the local political elite; the vice mayor of Pula mentioned the 
svjesno uništavanje (conscious destruction) of shipbuilding, directing his 
criticism upwards at the Croatian government and their plans for Uljanik.36 
The trope locates blame consciously within a set of actors rather than 
structurally—for instance in terms of capitalist conditions or as an unintended 
consequence of bad management.
These arguments are visible in the following figure that was 
circulating on the social media of radical left actors following the Uljanik 
crisis:
Figure 1. How many times can we fall for the same trick? (Crvena akcija)
36 “Cvek: Vlada RH svojim potezima svjesno uništava brodogradnju, a time i Uljanik,” accessed 
on May 14, 2019, http://www.ids-ddi.com/vijesti/aktualno/6118/cvek-vlada-rh-svojim-
potezima-svjesno-unistava-brodogradnju-a-time-i-uljanik// 
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Figure One’s title reads “How many times can we fall for the same 
trick?,” suggesting that the population is being duped by a set of nefarious 
practices. The top picture, depicting a person in a suit, has a caption stating, 
“The ‘bought’ management is deliberately harming a company formally owned 
by the state or workers.” The next graphic of a television news program is 
accompanied by a caption stating, “The media and politicians sow panic and 
call for the company to be removed from the state budget,” and finally the left-
hand graphic, depicting a factory torn in half, states, “Foreign competition 
buys the firm very cheaply and turns it into their subsidiary.” Presumably, 
something is missing, as the graphic is circular. That something, in situations 
where the company is floated on the market, bought by a (foreign) buyer, 
and then subsequently crashes, could be re-nationalization or the state 
intervening in the choice of a new buyer in situations in which there is mass 
public uproar or even unrest surrounding the course of events.
This infographic relates to the sister concept of predatory 
privatization, which frequently occurred in the post-Yugoslav contexts 
when companies were sold to a small number of “friends” of the political 
elite via sweetheart deals.37 Yet it also tells one story of how the process of 
systematic destruction is enacted in this context, conveying “intentional 
harm.” The accusations implicit in the trope of systematic destruction 
sometimes bordered on conspiracy. As a professor of political psychology 
Nebojša Blanuša argued in his discussion of political conspiracy theories in 
Croatia, “conspiracy theories are not typical of eccentrics, but are rather a 
widespread way of thinking connected primarily to politically controversial 
events and processes. It does not have solely antidemocratic, authoritarian, 
and collectively-protective potentials, since one of the types thereof 
functions as a way of ‘exposing the dirty linen’ of the democratic order.”38 
They are perhaps best understood then as a human reaction to the specific 
conditions in which many workers found themselves, and is compounded 
in situations where feelings of powerlessness are experienced. As Blanuša 
further dissected, the content of conspiracy theories relates to political 
cleavages. Those sympathetic to the HDZ are more likely to believe in 
conspiracies of “internal and external enemies of Croatia,” which relates to 
this role of conspiracies in producing homogenous national “groupness.”39 
And conspiracies critical of the Croatian government of the 1990s are less 
likely to held by HDZ members.
37 See also Nada Novaković, “Strikes, Unions and Privatization in Serbia,” Sociološki pregled 47, 
no. 1 (2013): 23–52.
38 See Nebojša Blanuša, “The Structure of Conspiratorial Beliefs in Croatia,” Anali Hrvatskog 
politološkog društva 6 (2009): 113–43, 142.
39 See Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004). 
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Concluding Remarks: The Transgenerational 
Appeal of an Ambiguous Trope
In summary, this trope clearly had a long history of use, reuse, and 
reinvention. Its success in the present-day context of Pula lay in its ideological 
ambiguity and emotive import, and that it tapped into an emergent structure 
of feeling defined by experiences of deindustrialization and material loss. 
Taking a step back, the trope also points to the weaknesses of left-wing 
language in public discourses. It is therefore unsurprising that this family of 
concepts came to the fore during a period of industrial crisis, as it relates 
to a structure of feeling present among disempowered elements of the 
working class in Pula. The ideological ambiguity is particularly relevant to 
Croatia, where strong symbolic divides exist and have been exacerbated by 
politicians who use them as a form of symbolic politics that detract from 
material issues.
 The transgenerational appeal of the trope among relatively young 
followers of parties calling for extensive social change and older interlocutors 
with whom I spoke, such as Ivan and Jadranka, is also worthy of comment. 
Older generations would likely be familiar with the term’s genealogy as well 
as its temporal connotations, which understand it as a process unwinding 
over time. For the younger generations, its reactiveness to the present and 
intentionality, which externalizes blame and responsibility, would be more 
salient. The emic concepts became a social commentary on the capitalist 
trajectory that Croatia and the wider region has taken. The positive spin 
implicit in policy references to creative destruction shifts here into a 
negative, accusatory form that shifts blame “ambiguously upwards” within 
state hierarchies and has the power to unify voices on the political left and 
anti-establishment right. Such ambiguous, powerful concepts tread the 
line between being potentially mobilizing—and potentially dangerous—and 
therefore warrant further study.
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